2020 IEEE International Symposium
on Information Theory
21-26 June 2020 • Los Angeles, California, USA
| Paper ID | G.2.2 | ||
| Paper Title | Quadratic Privacy-Signaling Games and Payoff Dominant Equilibria | ||
| Authors | Ertan Kazıklı, Sinan Gezici, Bilkent University, Turkey; Serdar Yüksel, Queen's University, Canada | ||
| Session | G.2: Game Theory | ||
| Presentation | Lecture | ||
| Track | Graphs, Games, Sparsity, and Signal Processing | ||
| Manuscript | Click here to download the manuscript | ||
| Virtual Presentation | Click here to watch in the Virtual Symposium | ||
| Abstract | We consider a privacy-signaling game problem in which a transmitter with privacy concerns and a receiver, which does not pay attention to these privacy concerns, communicate. In this communication scenario, the transmitter observes a pair of correlated random variables which are modeled as jointly Gaussian. The transmitter constructs its message based on these random variables with the aim to hide one of them and convey the other one. In contrast, the objective of the receiver is to accurately estimate both of the random variables so as to gather as much information as possible. These conflicting objectives are analyzed in a game theoretic framework where depending on the commitment conditions (of the sender), we consider Nash or Stackelberg equilibria. We show that a payoff dominant (i.e., most desirable for both players) Nash equilibrium is attained by affine policies and we explicitly characterize these policies. In addition, the strategies at the characterized Nash equilibrium is shown to form also a Stackelberg equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that there always exists an informative Stackelberg equilibrium for the multidimensional parameter setup. We also revisit the information bottleneck problem within our Stackelberg framework under the mean squared error distortion criterion where the information bottleneck setup has a further restriction that only one of the parameters is observed at the sender. We fully characterize the Stackelberg equilibria under certain conditions and when these conditions are not met we establish the existence of informative equilibria. | ||
Plan Ahead
2021 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory
11-16 July 2021 | Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
